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ABSTRACT
Recent research on entrepreneurship by sociologists has focused on subsec-
tors of the discipline rather than on entrepreneurship as a class. This review
draws insights from diverse literatures to develop a sociological perspective
on entrepreneurship as a whole. Until recently, the supply-side perspective,
which focuses on the individual traits of entrepreneurs, has been the domi-
nant school of research. Newer work from the demand-side perspective has
focused on rates, or the context in which entrepreneurship occurs. This re-
view emphasizes this less developed demand-side perspective—in particu-
lar, the influence of firms and markets on how, where, and why new enter-
prises are founded. I take stock of the differences and separation in the two
perspectives and argue that sociological frameworks, an embeddedness per-
spective, institutional and ecological theory, and multilevel models can be
used to integrate the two schools and extend their research implications.
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship occurs at significantly higher rates than at any time in the last
100 years (Gartner & Shane 1995). Recent survey evidence suggests that en-
trepreneurship is a meaningful lifestyle and career identity for many, with 4%
of all adults, 1 in 25, trying to start a new firm at any given time (Reynolds &
White 1997:7).
Along with the increase in entrepreneurship has come growth in the number











































































dations, professional organizations; and journals in the field of entrepreneur-
ship (Katz 1991, Robinson & Haynes 1991, Sandberg & Gatewood 1991). Yet
in spite of these developments, entrepreneurship researchers complain that
the field lacks a distinct professional identity, one defined by a unified body
of knowledge based on generally accepted social science theories (Bull &
Willard 1993). Surveys describe the field as organized by camps, where the
lack of cross-level and cross-disciplinary interaction tends to obscure the over-
all picture of what gives rise to entrepreneurship (Wortman 1987, Herron et al
1992, Gartner & Shane 1995). Many commentaries on the field have called for
an increase in the quality, interdisciplinary nature, and development of unify-
ing schemes to integrate diverse pieces of research on entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Bygrave & Hofer 1991). The purpose of this review is to examine sociological
research on entrepreneurship and draw selectively from other specialized lit-
eratures to create an agenda for further development of a sociological perspec-
tive on entrepreneurship.
I define entrepreneurship as the creation of new organizations (Gartner
1988), which occurs as a context-dependent, social and economic process
(Reynolds 1991, Low & Abrahamson 1997). I draw from diverse literatures to
take stock of what we know about how, where, and why new enterprise is
founded. A central problem with answering this question is that despite the
large and eclectic literature on entrepreneurship, relatively little is known
about the specific contexts of organizational founding (Reynolds & White
1997). For example, ecologists have systematically studied founding rates, but
they have focused on the development of universal concepts rather than on the
particular context (Amburgey & Rao 1996). As Baum & Haveman (1997:304)
note: “research has treated foundings as identical additions to homogeneous
populations.... Organizational attributes cannot be used as explanatory vari-
ables in analyses of founding because they cannot be observed for organiza-
tions that do not yet exist.”
The entrepreneurship literature can be classified into two schools: one tak-
ing the supply-side perspective and the other, the demand-side perspective. The
supply-side school focuses on the availability of suitable individuals to occupy
entrepreneurial roles; the demand-side, on the number and nature of the entre-
preneurial roles that need to be filled. The demand-side perspective suggests a
number of ways to examine the context of organizational founding, such as the
generation of new ventures by organizational hierarchies (Freeman 1986), the
activity of the professions (Wholey et al 1993), the policy of nation-states
(Dobbin & Doud 1997), the development of markets (White 1981, King &
Levine 1993), and the advent of technological change (Shane 1996). This re-
view focuses on the following contexts for the development of entrepreneur-
ship: the influences of two types of firms-organizational hierarchies and ven-










































































offerings (IPOs) and corporate acquisitions. I suggest that integrative frame-
works from sociology, a social embeddedness perspective, ecological and in-
stitution theories, and multilevel models be used to link supply and demand
perspectives. Last, I discuss sources of heterogeneity according to four differ-
ent levels of analysis: individual, organizational, market, and environmental.
I have chosen to examine the contextual analysis of organizational found-
ing in terms of firms and markets because they are both highly organized insti-
tutions in the United States and are also relatively underexamined as engines
of entrepreneurship. Preliminary results from the Entrepreneurship Research
Consortium indicate that a significant proportion of new start-ups are spon-
sored by existing organizations. Over one quarter of the people who say they
were involved in trying to start new ventures were doing it for their current
employer, rather than starting out on their own (Reynolds & Rong 1997). Sec-
ond, a focus on firms and markets is appropriate given the maturity of many
US industries. Third, the sociological aspects of how venture capital firms and
initial public offering (IPO) and acquisition markets affect the founding of
critical high-growth and high-technology organizations are underexamined
(Florida & Kenney 1988b:35). Finally, data from the last five years shows that
start-ups backed by venture capital are increasing as a percentage of all new
business incorporations (VentureOne Corporation 1997, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 1997).
The supply-side school examines entrepreneurship by focusing on the indi-
vidual characteristics of entrepreneurs, specifying potential mechanisms for
agency and change, whereas the demand-side emphasizes the push and pull of
context. Clearly, the founding of a firm may be dependent on the individual en-
trepreneur, as supply-side analysts suggest, but it is also clear that an individ-
ual cannot mobilize without an infrastructure. I suggest that multilevel models
be used to examine the influence of both these forces (DiPrete & Forristal
1994).
The idea that individuals and organizations affect and are affected by their
social context is a seminal argument in both classic and contemporary sociol-
ogy and has been applied to the study of entrepreneurship at different levels of
analysis. For example, Weber’s (1904) research illustrated how religious doc-
trine provided the cultural legitimation needed to shape the economic behavior
of individuals in ways that, in the aggregate, led to the rise of capitalism. We-
ber’s metatheory catalyzed the supply-side perspective and led psychologists
to develop research programs on culture and personality as the ushers of entre-
preneurship (McClelland 1961). Similarly, Burt (1992) has shown how entre-
preneurs’ chances of success are determined by the structure of their networks.
Individual entrepreneurs with deep “structural holes” in their networks—that
is, an absence of contact redundancy and substitution increase their chances of










































































they are central to and well positioned to manipulate a structure that is more
likely to produce higher levels of information.
DEFINING SUPPLY AND DEMAND PERSPECTIVES
The categorization of the supply and demand perspectives stems both from
Weber and from the economic concept that there is a supply and demand for
entrepreneurship (Casson 1995). The supply perspective has been criticized
for its single-cause logic and its lack of rigorous and appropriate research
methods; the demand perspective has been attacked for its lack of a theory of
action. Moreover, these two perspectives represent different methatheoretical
assumptions and levels of analysis-micro and macro, respectively. I consider
the two perspectives together here, however, because both advance causal
theories. It has been argued that individual traits tend to be enduring, whereas
social structures tend to be context- and time-dependent (Scott 1995). For ex-
ample, the findings on individuals’ “need for achievement” (McClelland
1975) change very little within society over short periods of time, but Gartner
& Shane (1995) have shown that the measure changes considerably at the so-
cietal level over time periods greater than ten years. Considering both supply
and demand perspectives promises to advance thorny questions about which
explanatory factors are universal across time and contexts and which factors
are particular to time and context.
Supply-Side Perspective
The central argument of the supply-side perspective and its traits-oriented ap-
proach is that special types of individuals create entrepreneurship. To advance
economically, societies need an adequate supply of these special individuals.
In this perspective, differences in the rate, form, and location of entrepreneurs
and entrepreneurship are attributed to differences in psychological, social, cul-
tural, and ethnic characteristics of individuals. Thus, supply-side psycholo-
gists have asked whether entrepreneurs have psychological traits and back-
grounds that differentiate them from other populations such as managers. Such
research has examined individuals’ need for achievement, locus of control,
risk-taking propensity, problem-solving style and innovativeness, leadership
style, values, and socialization experience. This line of inquiry has yielded
mixed results (Brockhaus & Horwitz 1986). While individuals are a key ingre-
dient in how and why new organizations are founded, the idea that psychologi-
cal traits alone account for entrepreneurship has been largely abandoned. See
Shaver and Scott (1991) for a review of the substantial research based on the
psychological perspective.
Sociological supply-side approaches have examined how attributes of cul-










































































Waldinger 1990, Light & Rosenstein 1995) produce entrepreneurial behavior.
Following the supply-side logic, such research holds that differences in entre-
preneurship can be predicted by differences in individuals—that is, that if one
can accurately describe the personality or social group of an individual entre-
preneur, one can then infer how, why, and where new businesses are founded.
While the majority of entrepreneurship research has been conducted from
the supply-side perspective, considerable evidence underscores the causal
logic critique of the supply-side perspective. For example, Baumol (1986) has
illustrated that differences in the rates of development across diverse cultures
are declining, and Gereffi & Hempel (1996) have shown that entrepreneurial
institutions are spreading globally. IPO markets are developing in countries
previously thought to have nonentrepreneurial cultures (Edmundson et al
1996), and policy documents in Third World countries are beginning to use
the concept of entrepreneur in describing the role of women in economic
development (Chin & Brauchi 1995). These examples imply that in addition to
individual and cultural differences, entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship are de-
termined by forces operating within other, larger contexts.
Both sociologists and psychologists have criticized supply-side studies for
their lack of rigorous and appropriate research methods (Frey 1984, Brockhaus
& Horwitz 1986, Aldrich 1990). A common research design flaw is sampling
on the dependent variable—that is, successful entrepreneurs and firms. Such
studies leave unanswered the question of whether an entrepreneurial person
created a successful business or a successful business created an entrepreneu-
rial person. Other criticisms focus on the lack of controls for important
variables such as age, education, gender, and work experience, which makes
the generalizability of findings problematic. Another criticism of supply-side
research centers on the use of cross-sectional methods, which disregard impor-
tant temporal and contextual events and processes. This is problematic be-
cause recent empirical studies illustrate that entrepreneurship is a dynamic
phenomenon that exists across time and space (Gartner & Shane 1995), with
the definition of an entrepreneur and what is defined as entrepreneurship
changing over the life course of individuals and industrial contexts (Brockhaus
& Horwitz 1986, Vesper 1990). In sum, supply-side perspectives by them-
selves are too simple, making economic activity too much a function of indi-
viduals and underplaying the role of external structural influences (Martinelli
1994).
While much has been learned about the personal attributes, behaviors, and
other characteristics associated with entrepreneurs, there has been little prog-
ress in relating types of entrepreneurs to the formation of new ventures. Be-
cause the challenges of founding new organizations vary by context, different
types of enterprises are likely to require different types of entrepreneurs.










































































als in founding new organizations and the founding rate are likely to remain
elusive (Low & Abrahamson 1997).
Demand-Side Perspective
The demand-side perspective was first developed by Marxists, economists,
and geographers (Light & Rosenstein 1995). Glade (1967:251) defined the
demand perspective as an “opportunity structure, an ‘objective’ structure of
economic opportunity and a structure of differential advantage in the capacity
of the system’s participants to perceive and act upon such opportunities.” In
contrast to the supply-side emphasis on stasis and individuals, the demand-
side perspective advances the study of entrepreneurship by asking what entre-
preneurs actually do—the decisions they make within social settings that are
changing over time. However, Glade’s contextual approach misses the micro-
macro link; as Martinelli (1994:486) notes, “he cannot go from behavior of the
individual to the higher-social phenomena, other than by claiming that growth
stems from the capability of the actor to take advantage of the situation.”
Newer work from a demand-side perspective, which is gaining popularity
in business schools and among economic sociologists, draws from ecological
and institutional theories in organizational sociology (Gartner 1989, Aldrich
1990, Aldrich & Wiedenmayer 1993, Bull & Willard 1993). Romanelli (1989)
characterizes this approach with her idea that the availability of resources en-
courages founders to emerge. Similarly, in case studies Freeman (1986) found
that semiconductor organizations create entrepreneurs that spin off new or-
ganizations because they give knowledge and resources to employees and
identify models of organization, market niches, and entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties. High employee turnover may be coupled with cultures that support and
revere those who leave to found new ventures. The ecological perspective,
while methodologically rigorous, has been criticized by entrepreneurship
scholars as lacking a theory of agency and context because it aggregates events
at the population level of analysis. Institutional theory has also been criticized
for having an underdeveloped theory of agency (DiMaggio 1988). However,
both perspectives are developing in directions that promise to address both the
issue of agency and the micro-macro link.
INFLUENCES OF FIRMS There is debate on whether it is the internal core or the
periphery of organizations—that is, the hierarchy or the market—that provides
the greatest source of new ventures for the economy. Aldrich & Zimmer
(1986) argue for the peripheral view, noting that the majority of new small
businesses are funded informally by the owner’s personal savings, family, and
network of friends. Similarly, Birch’s analyses (1987) support the peripheral
view that small new firms are the primary source of new ventures. Reynolds &










































































argues that the aggregate importance of new independent ventures has been
exaggerated and that entrepreneurship by new ventures is largely under the
control of large corporations. Arrow (1983) states that because of the increas-
ing cost of innovation, large firms play a greater role in innovation and eco-
nomic growth than do small firms. However, because there is a market for
research outcomes, small firms have become less inhibited about research for
which large development expenditures are necessary.
Organization theorists in sociology and economics have done considerable
research on the rise of the large corporation as a central mechanism for re-
source allocation and market control in the United States during the later half
of the twentieth century (Chandler 1962, 1977, Rumelt 1974, Armour & Teece
1978, Williamson 1985, Fligstein 1985, 1990, Palmer et al 1987, 1993, Roy
1997). Fligstein (1985) found that by 1979 the multidivisional firm (M-form)
had become the dominant form of industrial enterprise. Ingram & Baum
(1997:70) have documented the increasing prevalence of multiunit establish-
ments in the service sector, accounting for 25% of all service revenue in 1955
and 40% in 1987, with this trend continuing upward. Chandler (1980:11)
makes clear the distinction between M-form and unitary-form firms:
The traditional firm was a single-unit enterprise, with an individual or a
small number of owners operating a shop, store, factory, and a bank or trans-
portation line out of a single office. Normally, this type of firm undertook to
fulfill only a single economic function, produce or sell a single line of prod-
ucts, and operated in one geographic region. Before the rise of the modern
firm, the activities of these small, personally owned and managed enterprises
were coordinated and monitored primarily by market and price mechanisms.
The modern multiunit enterprise, in contrast, has come to operate in different
locations, often carrying out a number of economic activities and producing
or selling several lines of goods and services. The operation of its units and
the transactions among them have been internalized within the firm. The
activities of these units have come to be monitored and coordinated by the
decisions of salaried managers rather than by market mechanisms.
While we know a considerable amount about the conditions that give rise to
organizational hierarchies, we know very little about their effects on innova-
tion—that is, on the creation of entrepreneurs and the founding of new ven-
tures.
To gain insights, I turn to the interdisciplinary literatures on organization
theory and more specifically on corporate venturing for guiding propositions
on the role of large organizations in founding new ventures. Some of these
views state that large organizations suppress entrepreneurship, while others ar-
gue that they promote it. There is evidence to support both arguments; how-











































































According to one variant of the institutional perspective, organizations
have remarkable inertia that reflects the historical conditions at the time of
their founding. However, new forms arise and surviving organizations rein-
vent themselves by an entrepreneurial response to the institutional changes in
their environments. Classic case histories support these arguments (Selznick
1949, Kimberly 1975, Zald & Denton 1963). This pattern of adaptational or-
ganizational change is driven by the distribution of resources in the environ-
ment such as increasing urbanization and literacy, changes in state policies,
political revolution, and the development of a market economy (Stinchcombe
1965). The institutional perspective points to potential independent variables
concerning how the environment may influence entrepreneurial activity in
existing organizations.
The structural inertia thesis (Hannan & Freeman 1984) emphasizes that se-
lection processes favor organizations that have stable structures because they
are more reliable and accountable than organizations that experiment with
change. The inertia thesis is a useful concept to draw upon in understanding
which organizations are likely contexts for innovation and the founding of new
ventures. However, Freeman’s (1986) case studies of the semiconductor in-
dustry indicate a positive relationship between inertia and the organizational
production of entrepreneurs. The effect of slowness in transferring technology
and reallocating funding among divisions creates frustration that actually
pushes potential entrepreneurs out the door faster. Freeman’s findings are
consistent with psychological studies on the push effect of previous work ex-
perience (Brockhaus & Horwitz 1986).
Agency theory argues that governance forms in which the principal and
agent are integrated provide greater incentive for entrepreneurship (Jensen &
Meckling 1976). In this view, individuals are less likely to create new ventures
if they are employees in professionally managed corporations than if they are
independent entrepreneurs. This is because employees have divergent goals
from principals and because managers act to promote the security of their own
position rather than risk strategies of new venturing. Shane (1995) found sup-
port for this agency argument by performing time-series regression analysis of
rates of entrepreneurship versus real rates of economic growth. These findings
suggest that ownership form is an important context variable.
The key idea of transaction cost theory that is central to entrepreneurship is
that exchange is not costless and that sometimes it is less costly to use the
market to govern exchanges and at other times it is less costly to use the firm
(Swedberg 1994). Rumelt (1987) argues that firms are centers of sustained re-
sources and that they engage in explicit strategies to spawn new enterprises
because functions once attributed to capital markets have been transferred to
the hierarchy. However, transaction cost theory does not focus per se on the










































































instead focuses on what determines the payoff for entrepreneurial activity.
Payoff incentives can be blunted by an owner who exerts strong control over
residual returns. For example, the manipulation of transfer pricing and cost ac-
counting rules can obfuscate the rise of and results of innovation; hence, causal
ambiguity and general office intrusion blunt payoff incentives for entrepre-
neurship in large organizations (Williamson 1985). While seldom applied to
the study of entrepreneurship, the transaction cost theory can be useful in fram-
ing intraorganizational differences concerning employee incentives, which in
turn can form the basis for hypotheses about which firms are more likely to
engage in corporate venturing.
In the corporate venturing literature, Burgelman (1983:1349) defines cor-
porate entrepreneurship as “the process whereby firms engage in diversifica-
tion through internal development, which requires new resource combinations
to extend the firm’s activities in areas unrelated or marginally related to its
current domain of competence.” Hornsby et al (1993) argue that corporate en-
trepreneurship is a means by which firms enhance the entrepreneurial abilities
of their employees. Trends such as the increasing prevalence of M-form firms,
the maturation of industries, and increasing competition have given rise to
corporate venturing as a means for firms to remain competitive (Merrifield
1993). In Galunic’s 1996 inductive case study of ten divisions within a large
high-technology corporation, he observed that the creation of new divisions
and the recreation of existing ones occurred in response to industry and divi-
sional life cycles.
Zahra (1993) found that a company’s good financial performance is associ-
ated positively with corporate entrepreneurship. However, it is not clear
whether it is corporate entrepreneurship that induces positive financial per-
formance. In a review of Du Pont’s 85 “new-direction” businesses, several
determinants for success were identified: the possession of proprietary tech-
nology, heavy investment, conservative financial management, patient devel-
opment, and outstanding people. Other lessons learned from venturing activi-
ties were the importance of the following: tolerance of failure, separation of
venture and established businesses, corporate sponsorship, flexible planning
to manage uncertainty, training of entrepreneurial leaders, and recognition and
rewards for intrapreneurial individuals. For further reviews of corporate
venturing, see Block & MacMillan (1993).
The central findings of those investigating corporate venturing indicate that
the types of entrepreneurship best suited to large organizations may be (a) ven-
tures based on the redeployment of the firm’s resources and the extension of its
competitive positions and (b) ventures that require large project administration
and longer term resources. Ventures more attractive to individuals and small
firms may be ones based on opportunities created by new and emerging mar-










































































tions start new ventures are the characteristics of the organizational culture in
which corporate employees operate and the reaction of organizational partici-
pants to changes in social and economic environments.
In general, the research on corporate venturing is atheoretical and poorly
designed, and definitions of success are inadequately described. However, this
work does illustrate that there is considerable intraorganizational heterogene-
ity. Here, advances can be gained by borrowing ethnographic and interpretive
approaches (Smircich 1983) and organization theory and quantitative methods
in sociology to guide studies of entrepreneurship. With respect to the latter,
Krackhardt’s (1995) application of Burt’s structural hole theory to explain dif-
ferences in entrepreneurial opportunity within corporations is a step in that di-
rection.
Venture Capital Firms Venture capital firms control a type of financing that
addresses a variety of barriers to innovation: the inertia of large corporations,
the risk aversion of traditional financial markets, and the liability of newness
inherent in business start-ups (Florida & Kenney 1988a). Because there has
been little sociological study of venture capital firms and financial markets
(Adler & Adler 1984), I first describe these organizations and institutions
and then suggest avenues for using a sociological perspective in future re-
search.
Venture capital firms provide seed, start-up, mezzanine, and bridge-stage
funding for new ventures. The economic logic underpinning the business of
professionally managed risk capital is the assumption that investment in entre-
preneurial companies, while carrying higher risk, can provide higher returns
than conventional investments. New ventures that are well suited to venture
capital financing include high-technology and high-growth businesses with a
fast “burn-rate” of capital in a variety of industries, including communications,
electronics, health care, and retailing and consumer products, among others.
Venture capitalists form partnerships and syndications to share expertise,
spread risk, and raise pools of money from sources such as university endow-
ments, pension funds, and previously successful entrepreneurs, known as “an-
gels.” Institutional investors that participate in venture capital have tended to
spread their risk by participating as limited partners in a varied portfolio of
venture capital investment pools (Brophy & Guthner 1988). The organization of
venture capital firms more closely resembles network than hierarchical forms
of organization (Powell 1990). While the first venture capital firm began in the
1930s, venture capital did not become a highly organized form of financing
until a change in federal legislation in the late 1970s, which for the first time al-
lowed typically risk-averse pension funds to invest in venture capital funds.
Venture capital differs from debt capital because venture capitalists are










































































velopment of new firms. Florida & Kenney (1988b:43) provide data showing
that venture capital is “spatially fixed” around high concentrations of financial
institutions and technology-intensive enterprises. They note that a growing
body of literature recognizes a dynamic complementarity existing between
large companies, universities, and small companies. Venture capitalists en-
hance such environments by acting as both catalyst and capitalist, providing
the resources and the contacts to facilitate new business start-ups, spinoffs, and
expansions. Because they sit at the center of extended networks linking fin-
anciers, entrepreneurs, corporate executives, headhunters and consultants,
venture capitalists have a propulsive effect on the rates of business formations.
The use of venture capital has been on the rise. From 1992 to 1997, avail-
able venture capital funds increased by 158% , from $4.1 billion to $10.4 bil-
lion. These funds supported 952 ventures in 1992 and 2429 ventures in 1997,
an increase of 155%. The median age of companies financed by venture capital
in 1996 was two years and ten months. Early-stage venture capital is the most
expensive to raise, and its abundance varies with market cycles. The number of
firms receiving initial venture capital rose from 327 in 1992 to 628 in 1996. In
1996, 39% of all venture capital funded early-stage start-up companies (Ven-
tureOne Corporation 1996, 1997).
INFLUENCES OF MARKETS Markets for initial public offerings (IPOs) are
linked to venture capital firms because an IPO is a sequentially planned exit
strategy for founding entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Venture capital
firms “harvest” their successful investment in firms that have shown solid re-
sults and high growth potential through their relationships with stock under-
writers, who can take the fledgling firms public. An IPO allows a company to
access public capital markets to reduce its debt, provide greater liquidity for
investors, commit to expansion, and therefore be more attractive to lenders. An
IPO provides a publicly traded share price, which gives both management and
shareholders outside information about the company’s value. The share price
at which the owners of the company agree to trade their ownership for cash
depends on the overall market conditions, the characteristics of the company,
and the policies of investment bankers. In 1996, 275 companies went public,
raising a total of $11.2 billion, compared with approximately 140 companies
that raised $5.8 billion in 1992. The average age of companies going public in
the decade of the 1990s is approximately 7.9 years, and the average pre-
offering valuation in 1996 was over $125 million (VentureOne Corporation
1997).
Acquisition markets An alternative to an IPO, an acquisition is another form
of second-stage financing that also provides an exit strategy for founding en-










































































via acquisition provides the acquired firm with immediate access to sources of
capital and other resources, thus increasing the rapidity with which the newer
firm becomes established. Arguing that the market for corporate control is an
important context in which to examine innovation and entrepreneurship, Hitt
et al (1996) found that firms that grow by acquisition tend to invest less in in-
ternal venturing. Because there is a market for research outcomes, there is a
symbiotic relationship between large firms that seek to externalize the risk of
research and development by acquiring new firms and new firms that seek ac-
quisition in order to gain access to the distribution and financial muscle of
large organizations (Arrow 1983). This empirically underexamined form of
entrepreneurship is prevalent in industries such as biotechnology and pharma-
ceuticals. In 1996, 155 venture-backed companies were acquired. This tally
does not include acquisitions of companies that had already gone public, be-
cause an IPO is also considered a liquidity event. The market for acquisitions
has been growing steadily and in 1996 accounted for $21.3 billion in assets.
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDEDNESS PERSPECTIVE An important perspective for
understanding social and economic environments is the embeddedness ap-
proach (Granovetter 1985, Lie 1997). In his seminal 1985 essay, Granovetter
argues that economic environments are embedded in social and structural rela-
tionships that modify neoclassical predictions of atomistic economic behavior.
Contrasting his argument to Williamson’s (1975) classic dichotomy of “mar-
kets and hierarchies,” Granovetter illustrates how economic processes, whether
governed by market or hierarchy, are affected by their embeddedness in social
and structural relations. The character of venture capital firms and IPO and ac-
quisition markets exemplifies both relational and spatial embeddedness.
With respect to relational embeddedness, Eisenhardt & Forbes (1984) de-
scribe how in venture-backed Silicon Valley companies, one cohort of suc-
cessful companies seeds successive generations. This phenomenon makes the
market for venture capital “regenerative” in relation to successful ventures, be-
cause such ventures create “angels” and “serial entrepreneurs” who provide
the financial, human, and social capital to start new ventures. Working this
same vein, Florida & Kenney (1988a,b) develop a formal model of the types of
firms in the network that are catalysts, and they document the regional cluster-
ing of venture capital resource flows.
Both IPO and acquisition markets are also relationally embedded with ven-
ture capital firms because they are tied to their “harvest cycle,” being the main
liquidation mechanisms of successful founding entrepreneurs and venture
capital investors. Venture-backed firms seeking placement on the IPO or ac-
quisition market are also subject to status-ordering processes controlled by
opinion leaders such as industry analysts and leading bankers (Podolny 1993,










































































ing the most prestigious investment bank as an underwriter sends a favorable
signal to the market. The case of IPOs is interesting since most venture-backed
firms have yet to turn a profit, and their status is shaky and dependent on inside
knowledge and networks within a particular industrial context. These charac-
teristics raise a new line of questioning about what we know about the status
ordering and embeddedness of markets. For example, does the salience of
status ordering still hold in a context in which there are young markets and
firms that have had little opportunity to establish a reputation? Also, how do
status relations affect IPO markets and the rate of foundings with respect to the
liability of adolescence?
Spatial factors such as the density and proximity of venture capital firms
have an effect on the founding of new ventures. While Florida & Kenney iden-
tified the spatial clustering of venture capital resources, Schoonhoven & Eis-
enhardt (1992) used the concept of clustering, or what they termed incubator
regions, to predict the comparative birth rate of new organizations in a cross-
regional analysis. Also taking a spatial approach, Reynolds et al (1995) used
two types of independent variables to predict regional differences in the birth
of new firms in the United States between 1976 and 1988: regional features
such as economic diversity, volatile industries, employment policy flexibility;
and features that reflected the population itself, such as career opportunity and
personal wealth.
In sum, the work on incubator regions provides solid evidence that geo-
graphic areas that have higher concentrations of resources, such as a large
number of venture capital firms and relevant specialized service companies,
have higher birth rates of new ventures. First introduced in work on geographic
areas (Pennings 1982), the gist of this explanation is that density and proximity
are determinants of the entrepreneurial behavior, organizing capacity, and
competitive advantages of regions. This argument is pervasive, used initially
in classic organizational sociology (Stinchcombe 1965) and later in the busi-
ness strategy literature (Porter 1990).
While the regional-factors work predicts the context in which certain forms
of new enterprise are likely to be founded, it is not regions that start new busi-
nesses. To predict how and why new ventures are founded, we must ask other
questions. At the individual level, are the entrepreneurs who are making use of
resources in incubator regions—the ones whom supply-side psychologists
claim have a high need for achievement (McClelland 1961) and a high internal
locus of control (Rotter 1966)? How do the entrepreneurs’ backgrounds—their
prior start-up experience and social ties (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1990)—
affect the new businesses they found? At the organizational level, what type of
organizational structures and cultures produce which forms of genealogical
progeny—those that are “integrated” and have flat hierarchies or those that are










































































environmental level, do such start-ups happen during periods of resource
competition, resource munificence, or technological discontinuity (Tushman
& Anderson 1986)?
Additional research should link the work on regional variation with the role
of individuals and firms in starting new ventures. This integrated approach can
also address a number of important theoretical questions of interest to sociolo-
gists who study the origin and change of institutions, because it provides a set-
ting for observing both interest and agency effects and universal versus par-
ticular effects. Future studies should also advance beyond the level of anecdote
and descriptive analysis.
The work on regional variation heralds the need to reconcile the anomalous
findings of research on incubator regions and research on density dependence
based on population ecology theory. The findings of Schoonhoven & Eisen-
hardt imply that the effects of competition, the backbone of ecology, are less
important than the effects of cooperation and spatial proximity, features that
facilitate organizational learning (Ingram & Baum 1997)—that is, the easy
transmission of technical and managerial know-how from one generation of
entrepreneurs and firms to the next.
In response to these anomalies, the ecological literature has shifted toward
an emphasis on contextual analysis. (See Baum & Oliver 1996 for a review of
the ecological perspective and level of analysis.) The spatial effects of legiti-
mation and competition are beginning to be examined according to political
boundaries such as cities, states, regions, and nation-states; such studies have
been made in the context of US and German breweries (Carroll & Wade 1991),
Italian cooperative banks (Freeman & Lomi 1994), and automobile manufac-
turers (Hannan et al 1995). While too early to be definitive, preliminary evi-
dence indicates that organizations compete locally but organizational popula-
tions evolve globally. This evidence, however, further confuses how different
levels of action might be linked (Lomi & Larsen 1996).
The commodity-chains perspective offers an alternative explanation for
where new enterprise is likely to locate. In shifting global markets, resource
dependencies and transaction-cost exchange relations among leading and sub-
servient firms drive the processes and location of new venture formation. Con-
trary to ecological work, this perspective suggests that cultural and political
(nation-state) boundaries—as distinct from firm, market, and industry bounda-
ries—are increasingly inconsequential in enterprise formation (Gereffi 1994).
Aldrich (1990) offers another explanation for where enterprise is likely to
be founded by focusing on the relationship between spatial proximity and in-
formation transmission. Because venture capitalists fund “ideas,” an asset that
bankers cannot easily value, they assure control of these abstract assets by re-
quiring board seats and boilerplate management agreements. Suchman (1995)










































































more routinized over time and that routinization declined with geographical
distance. These findings provide systematic evidence of the mechanisms that
venture capitalists use in spreading knowledge that leads to founding new or-
ganizations.
The limited sociological literature on acquisition activity presents several
research implications. While both economists and sociologists have observed
that the market for acquisitions occurs in waves (Golbe & White 1988, Thorn-
ton 1995, Stearns & Allan 1996), sociologists have empirically examined the
collective properties of acquisition activity. On the basis of an industry case
study, Thornton (1995) has argued that the market for acquisitions is contin-
gent on the competitive and cooperative structure of the particular industry as
well as on universal models in the larger business environment. In an organiza-
tional field of the largest US firms, Stearns & Allan (1996) found that mimicry
of new innovations in corporate financing led to the 1980s merger wave. Using
a sample of large industrial firms, Amburgey & Miner (1992) showed how
acquisition activity has momentum effects. Also sampling large industrial
firms, Haunschild (1993) was able to predict the pattern of acquisition activity
on the basis of corporate board networks. Based on a sample of the 100 largest
firms in the United States, Fligstein (1990) illustrated that the state influences
the market for acquisitions because antitrust policies tend to give rise to new
innovations in integration. For example, the prohibition against horizontal and
vertical integration gave rise to diversified integration as a new form of enter-
prise.
All these sociological attributes—local industry and global cross-industry
pressures, networks, mimicry, momentum, and the activities of the state—are
likely to affect the market for acquisitions and therefore, second-stage funding
for fledgling new ventures. Because acquisitions occur in waves, one would
expect this pattern to affect opportunity structures for entrepreneurs and the li-
abilities of the adolescence of organizations. Moreover, the advent of inves-
tor capitalism (Useem 1996), coupled with the rise of the market for acquisi-
tions, has made an acquisition an established option for entrepreneurs. Histori-
cally, such changes in business practices are likely to accompany a shift in
logic—in this case, a shift from thinking of a business as a relatively perma-
nent lifestyle to considering it a time-limited, successive endeavor. Such a
shift implies a change in an entrepreneur’s identity and career path (i.e., to
that of serial entrepreneur) and, concomitantly, an increased chance of new
ventures (Gartner & Shane 1995). These conjectures await formal testing.
INTEGRATING FRAMEWORKS
The knowledge base of entrepreneurship research has been generated by three










































































1934), and sociology (Weber 1904). Each of these disciplines asks different
questions, employs different metatheories, and focuses at different levels of
analysis (Martinelli 1994). While the social embeddedness of firms and mar-
kets is a useful concept to suggest ways to contextualize organizational found-
ing, other approaches relevant to a sociological perspective are ecological and
institutional theories and multilevel models (DiPrete & Forristal 1994).
Ecological and Institutional Perspectives
Greenfield & Strickon (1981) were the first to suggest a population perspec-
tive as a new paradigm for entrepreneurship. However, it is Aldrich’s (1990)
work on population ecology that has migrated from sociology to propel
demand-side research on entrepreneurship. Aldrich argues for a refocus on
“rates,” because studying individual traits of entrepreneurs fails to provide in-
formation on the environmental context within which entrepreneurs interpret
and make sense of their actions (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer 1993). Reynolds
(1992) suggests that population and organizational ecology is a productive
paradigm in which to develop research on the societal context of entrepreneur-
ship.
The strength of population ecology’s formal theory and methods lends
clarity to generating falsifiable hypotheses and to advancing understanding of
organizational founding at the population level. As Aldrich (1999) notes, one
sign of population ecology theory's sophistication is the developing use of
computer simulations for hypothesis testing. Population ecology has devel-
oped useful concepts such as the liabilities of newness and adolescence that are
applicable to framing organizational and environmental effects on new
ventures. However, the current theory does not provide any explanation for the
role of individual action in influencing founding conditions (Hannan & Carroll
1992, Hofer & Bygrave 1992). Ecological data sets do not contain information
on such microprocesses. Population ecology theory has emphasized the im-
portance of outside forces or unconscious action as causal forces, rather than
individuals' goals and intents. It has generally adhered to the important goal of
developing and testing general theory on the patterns of founding and disband-
ing of organizational populations.
However, ecological research is beginning to advance a contextual focus.
In studying the founding rate of baseball teams and leagues, Land et al (1994)
demonstrate that, in addition to the conventional density-dependent effects,
spatial and relational embeddedness also affect founding rates. Using the con-
cept of structural mutualism, they show that league foundings have a positive
impact on team foundings. Linking entrepreneurs’ choices to a founding rate
analysis of the structure of the Manhattan hotel industry, Baum & Haveman
(1997) show that entrepreneurs located new hotels geographically close to es-










































































roll (1995), pacesetters in use of the ecological paradigm, suggested a focus on
content and adaptation, and this invitation is encouraging the participation of
new scholars and perspectives (Amburgey & Rao 1996).
The strength of the institutional perspective is that it does not have restric-
tive scope conditions with respect to the rationality of actors, historical time,
and level of analysis. It has breadth in the sense that the socially constructed
nature of “actors” can be rational individuals or seemingly irrational organiza-
tions and their environments (Scott 1995, Scott 1997). This theoretical flexi-
bility provides the ability to link the micro supply-side and macro demand-side
perspectives. For example, Van de Ven & Garud (1989), using a case study of
the cochlear implants industry, made the first theoretical statement encom-
passing both micro and macro levels. Using a recursive, emergent social sys-
tems model (Romanelli 1991), Van de Ven & Garud argue that the odds of a
firm successfully developing an innovation are largely a function of the extant
infrastructure at the industrial level. This community infrastructure facilitates
and constrains entrepreneurs, but it is entrepreneurs who construct and
change the infrastructure. This infrastructure emerges and changes through
the accretion of numerous institutional, resource, and proprietary events that
co-produce each other through the actions of many public- and private-sector
actors over an extended period (Ventresca & Lacey, forthcoming, Whitley
1996).
While such institutionally oriented research reflects “thick descriptions” of
the context of human networks that enact the emergence of new ventures, it
needs to advance beyond the case-study stage to include large-sample studies
and formal models. Ingram & Inman’s (1996) study of hotel foundings in the
Niagara Falls market is one example that integrates historical description with
quantitative modeling of how institutional structure increased the founding
rate (in this case, how the development of parks influenced the development of
nearby hotels). Further advances hinge on the use of longitudinal quantitative
methods and attention to historical detail to capture important time-dependent
relationships, such as the life cycles of individuals and organizations in rela-
tion to population life cycles. The study by Van de Ven & Grazman (1994) on
a genealogy of the Twin Cities’ health care organizations is a step in that di-
rection.
Multilevel Models
If we build on ecological and institutional approaches, future entrepreneurship
research should address the effects of individual-level traits, organizational
and market-level variables, and population-level characteristics in models of
the founding of new ventures. However, as Aldrich (1992) states, to generalize
about entrepreneurs, individuals need to be studied; to generalize about new










































































promises to advance our understanding of who becomes an entrepreneur and
how, why, and where organizations are founded, it is not an easy task. One po-
tential solution is to use multilevel models.
DiPrete & Forristal (1994) provide a useful review of recent advances in the
application of multilevel models to substantive problems in sociology. They
take as their starting point Blalock’s (1984) definition: “The essential feature
of all contextual-effects models is an allowance for macro processes that are
presumed to have an impact on the individual actor over and above the effects
of any individual-level variables that may be operating” (quoted in DiPrete &
Forristal 1994:354). They then note, “If we generalize his use of the term ‘indi-
vidual’ to apply to any unit that is micro relative to some other macro level in
the analysis, his definition is still quite serviceable” (333). In other words, if
we extrapolate, the idea of context can include individual contexts (e.g., psy-
chological traits, background characteristics, cognitive schemas), spatial con-
texts, (countries, states, regions, communities), temporal contexts (history),
organizational contexts (U-form, M-form, network form), and social/cul-
tural/economic contexts (ethnic groups, social classes, economic sectors, cul-
tural logics). We can also identify precedents, such as Fligstein’s 1987 work
using the functional backgrounds of CEOs to predict shifts in conceptions of
control prevailing in an organizational field of Fortune 500 firms.
While DiPrete & Forristal (1994) review the assumptions of various multi-
level models, they also caution that there is no general theory of multilevel
relationships. They point out that many researchers theorize at multiple levels
of analysis but use data at only one level, or use data at multiple levels but theo-
rize at one level, both of which can raise issues of the ecological fallacy (see
Blalock 1984 for a summary). Because of such obstacles, it is important to
identify sources of heterogeneity at different levels of analysis.
Sources of Heterogeneity
INDIVIDUALS Due to space limitations, I have not elaborated on literature
reviewed elsewhere that examines the psychological traits, individual back-
grounds, and behavioral characteristics of entrepreneurs. However, I do want
to emphasize that new insights can be gleaned by building on the classic vari-
ables highlighted in psychology (the need for achievement, risk-taking pro-
pensity, and locus of control) and by integrating advances from the literatures
in cognitive psychology and decision biases (March 1988). For example, Dosi
& Lovallo (1997:42) use an eclectic mix of experimental evidence and litera-
ture review to argue that decision-making biases have important ramifications
for the nature of entrepreneurship and for how and why entrepreneurs found
new ventures. Such integration introduces to the study of entrepreneurship
concepts such as organizational learning, allocation of attention, decision-










































































competitive groups (March 1991, Lant & Baum 1995). These concepts pro-
vide a theoretical bridge from the rational models that underlie the psychologi-
cal work on entrepreneurs to sociological interest in individual irrationalities
and collectivism. Moreover, melding the insights from cognitive psychology
and decision bias work with those from institutional theory affords a focus on
both the signal the environment delivers and the way internal representations
of the world are constructed. It provides one way of perceiving how individu-
als’ actions scale up to organizational outcomes, how new ventures and indus-
tries are spawned, and a way to treat sticky metatheorical issues of individual-
ism versus structuralism (Mayhew 1980).
ORGANIZATIONS We understand more about how interorganizational differ-
ences affect organizational founding than we do about how intraorganizational
differences matter. Hannan & Freeman (1987) showed that the relationships
among different types of organizational forms in a population affect the emer-
gence and the diversity of new ventures—for example, that the growth of in-
dustrial unions restrained the founding rate of craft unions. Studies on resource
partitioning and organizational size and mutualism also illustrate that diversity
among types and forms of organizations has important consequences for
founding rates (Carroll 1985, Barnett & Carroll 1987). Similarly, Baum &
Oliver (1996) showed that nonprofit forms proliferated over for-profit forms
of organizations.
However, an important and unexplored form of heterogeneity is the influ-
ence of large, diversified, M-form organizations. The multidivisional (M-
form) represents a now-established sea change in organizational populations,
and we have no studies of its effects on founding rates. The M-form organiza-
tion presents a problematic context to study because M-forms span industries
and different resource pools, thereby violating theoretical assumptions of ho-
mogeneous population boundaries (Thornton & Tuma 1995). Van de Ven &
Grazman (1994) have approached this problem using event histories to study
how existing organizations may be recombined or new organizations devel-
oped from the resources and ancestral forms in a population of organizations.
According to resource partitioning theory, interorganizational heterogene-
ity evolves endogenously as industries mature over time because a few gener-
alist firms that exploit mass markets come to dominate the industry. This in
turn should increase the founding rate of new businesses because entrepre-
neurs take advantage of the opportunity to found specialist organizations as
demand rises in areas that have been neglected by generalists, creating new
niche markets. However, it may be unrealistic to assume that generalists (M-
forms) will not attempt to exploit these new niche markets and compete with
the entrepreneurs starting new ventures. There are numerous examples of large










































































marketplace. For example, retailing firms like the Gap use a divisionalized
parent-firm structure as a strategy to avoid diluting the status of its low- and
high-prestige brands (Podolny 1993). These observations warrant research to
further develop resource partitioning theory.
The M-form also is an appreciable source of intraorganizational heteroge-
neity, which has psychological, sociological, and economic dimensions for
entrepreneurship (Arrow 1983:16). Reviewing the literature on corporate hier-
archies and venturing reveals that intraorganizational differences—that is, dif-
ferences in internal structure within similar organizational forms—do affect
the founding of new ventures. Studies of differences in organizational culture,
identities, and managerial ideologies and styles within corporate hierarchies
align well with attempts by economic sociologists to understand the autonomy
of cultural effects in economic environments (Zukin & DiMaggio 1990). Di-
rect measures of internal organizational structure also promise to advance
ecological research on foundings, which so far has relied on gross measures of
industrial concentration and organization size to understand how internal dif-
ferentiation of organizational forms influences founding rates.
The description of venture capital firms suggests that their social organiza-
tion has important effects on organizational founding. Advancing our under-
standing of this influence hinges on finding ways of quantifying the social em-
beddedness of relationships among entrepreneurs, angels, law firms, venture
capital firms, and other financial institutions. Venture capital presents an inter-
esting sociological topic because its social organization defies the neoclassical
economic principles of financial markets, in which, under conditions of perfect
information, investments flow freely across organizational and spatial
boundaries to enterprises that offer the highest rate of return. With respect to
venture capital—backed firms, however, the free flow of investments is
controlled instead by the organizational and spatial networks characteristic of
the venture capital industry.
MARKETS Using case studies, Freeman (1986) illustrated that foundings oc-
cur in waves that correspond with market cycles. Also, the reciprocal effects of
markets and firms (Fligstein 1996) are one way to examine what determines
the timing of when new ventures are founded. Because of the coupling of mar-
kets and firms, the timing of market cycles in relation to organizational found-
ing raises several lines of inquiry. How does a shock in one market affect an-
other—for example, in the relationship between IPO and acquisition markets?
When IPO and acquisition markets are in a down cycle, they decrease liquida-
tion options for venture capital firms. How do venture capital firms influence
the patterns of IPO markets, and vice versa, with respect to organizational
founding? In what context do acquisition waves produce waves of organiza-










































































for acquisitions, in terms of momentum and mimicry, affect liabilities of new-
ness and adolescence of firms? How do status-ordering processes mediate how
venture capital firms and the IPO market affect the founding of new ventures
(White 1987)?
ENVIRONMENTS Because the potential for founding new ventures depends on
entrepreneurs' finding and utilizing opportunities in the environment, examin-
ing sources of environmental heterogeneity is one way to understand how and
where new ventures are founded. Here, there are several issues to advance
that hinge on the level of analysis employed and on endogenous and exoge-
nous effects. Reconciling the effects of density dependence with the findings
on incubator regions is one way to advance the research on organizational
founding. Does the increasing density in maturing industries make the plight
of entrepreneurs more difficult, as ecological theory would imply? Or, does it
translate into increasing resource munificence, thereby increasing the ability
of entrepreneurs in a particular space to garner resources for founding new
ventures? So far the work on incubator regions would lead us to believe that
environments with higher density—because they offer greater opportunities
for mutualism and resource exchanges among firms—are more prone to learn-
ing, imitation, and collective action, all elements necessary to building infra-
structure. However, not all organizations in a population benefit equally from
any set of available resources. Baum & Singh (1994) have shown that found-
ing rates were depressed when organizations had niche overlap—that is, when
organizations competed for the same resources.
The contradictions in the predictions generated by studies of incubator
regions vs. those of population ecology theory may be related to differences in
the level of analysis. That is, the way organizations are selected for inclusion in
empirical research may determine whether or not an analysis captures most of
the competition effects (Singh 1993, Thornton & Tuma 1995). In population
ecology theory, populations refer to entire industries, regardless of geographi-
cal dispersion. In contrast, studies of incubator regions focus on the geographi-
cal distribution of firms and largely ignore the variables of industry size, ma-
turity, and concentration—all variables related to the distribution of resources
and, most likely, to the founding rate.
Another potential explanation for these discrepant findings involves tech-
nological innovations that introduce competence-destroying discontinuities
into an environment (Tushman & Anderson 1986). Entrepreneurial ventures
that take advantage of competence-destroying technologies would no longer
be in direct competition with established firms. Nevertheless, it might still be
in the best interests of a start-up firm to locate in the region of established
firms, due to the proximity of other firms in the industry, suppliers, and an ex-










































































findings is that the populations of organizations of ecological studies are
largely located in low techology or diminishing returns sectors. However, the
work on incubator regions focuses on high technology of increasing return
sectors (Arthur 1990, Bygrave 1995).
Conceptual frameworks are needed both to move research beyond the de-
scriptive level, as in the case of incubator regional analysis, and to contextual-
ize ecological effects. In trying to determine the best environmental context for
successful foundings, Low & Abrahamson (1997) have developed a model
that groups different organizational and competitive challenges into three
stages of industry evolution: emerging, growth, and mature. This typology has
two axes: one details transmission mechanisms, movements, bandwagons, and
clones; the other axis contains context characteristics, entrepreneur networks,
behaviors, stakeholders, and strategy/structure. In sum, answering the ques-
tion of how and where new enterprises are founded requires conducting more
research aimed at discovering which resources, in which industries, at which
stage of industry evolution are more significant than others.
Modeling Contextual Heterogeneity
Sociological methodology is progressing rapidly in its use of multilevel
models (DiPrete & Forristal 1994). Strang & Tuma (1993), for example, have
developed a heterogeneous diffusion model that incorporates individual- and
contextual-level variables into an event-history framework to represent the so-
cial structural relationships that are thought to channel diffusion. Such models
can combine individual-, organizational-, and environmental-level variables
to understand how individual behavior is influenced by individual factors and
by the social structure of inter-actor influences (Davis & Greve 1997). Extend-
ing the application of these models to explore the issues highlighted in this re-
view—for example, to create a model of the influences of corporate hierar-
chies or venture capital firm networks on organizational foundings—would
represent a significant advance in entrepreneurship research.
This new class of models addresses the methodological problem of how to
incorporate population heterogeneity, time nonstationarity, and varying de-
grees of interdependence among members of the population in the same mod-
eling framework. These models decompose noncontagious and contagious
influences, separating the contagious influence in terms of the susceptibility of
the focal individual or organization to influence by other individuals and or-
ganizations, the infectiousness of previous individuals and organizations,
and the social proximity of the focal individual and organization to previous
individuals and organizations. This review has highlighted sociological per-
spectives in the founding of new ventures, such as embeddedness, imitation,










































































tice by one actor affects the rate for the population. These methods can ad-
vance what we know about the conditions under which individual entrepre-
neurs are networked, and the genealogy of the firms and the characteristics of
the resource environments from which they diffuse, in predicting the founding
of new ventures. These models are not a simple solution because there is cau-
tion about their use with incomplete populations, making the data collection
requirements appear daunting. However, ongoing research is examining the
consequences of less complete data and the implications of less costly sam-
pling for obtaining valid results (Greve et al 1993).
CONCLUSION
Over the last thirty years, Weber’s theory on the origin of the entrepreneurial
spirit as a cultural account of individualism has been the metatheory underly-
ing the dominant supply-side perspectives in entrepreneurship research. The-
ory development and empirical research from a demand-side perspective are
currently underdeveloped but on the rise. This review boosts the demand per-
spective by focusing on the influences exerted by firms and markets. It sug-
gests that sociological frameworks, an embeddedness perspective, ecological
and institutional theories, and multilevel models could be used to integrate
analyses of individual, organizational, market, and environmental characteris-
tics in explaining how, where, and why new ventures are founded. In sociol-
ogy, there have been recurrent reminders of the importance of the totality of in-
terpretation, as evidenced by periodic essays to “bring back” men (Homans
1964), firms (Baron & Bielby 1980), states (Skocpol 1985), society (Friedland
& Alford 1991), and work (Barley 1996). Rapid advances in theoretical and
empirical work in sociology are now providing avenues for “bringing back”
the study of entrepreneurship into sociological research.
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